By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-
We saw last week that Mussolini, by the late summer of 1937, was
seriously concerned by the fact that the Ethiopian Patriots were still
unbeaten, and, on the contrary, that their “rebellion”, as the fascist
Viceroy, Graziani, dubbed it, seemed indeed to be increasing in
strength.
Mussolini’s Son-in-Law’s Diary
The Duce’s concern was later underlined by his son-in-law Ciano, the
then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who noted in his Diary, on 13
September 1937, that his master was “annoyed ” by the Gojam “revolt”,
which, he noted, was “of a considerable size.” Later, on 17 September,
however, Mussolini spoke “more optimistically”, on the grounds that the
“revolt” was “not spreading”, and that “measures to suppress it-
including gas – have been ordered”.
It is worthy of note that Ciano, in the privacy of his diary, freely
refers to these orders for the use of gas, though the employment of that
substance was rigidly excluded from all official fascist publications.
A few days later, on 23 September, the Minister of Italian Africa,
Lessona reported to Mussolini about the position in person. He told the
Duce, according to Ciano, that there were “numerous revolts, but
localised.” The Italian Foreign Minister nonetheless noted that Patriot
activity was “hindering demobilisation and was a burden on our
finances”. He feared, moreover, that “at Mascal something on a larger
scale may break out”.
Disarmament
The disarmament of the “native” population meanwhile continued to
receive the highest fascist priority. Thus Graziani telegraphed Lessona,
on 7 September 1937, that it was necessary “to make the population well
understand that the only way of living in peace” was by delivering up
their arms. Shortly afterwards he noted, in a report of 26 September on
the situation in Lasta, that there was “only one end: to disarm the
population.” The number of arms confiscated or surrendered throughout
the country was by then reaching astronomical proportions. The London
“Daily Telegraph” of 30 September 1937 quoted Italian sources as stating
that they amounted to 283,954 rifles, 999 machine-guns, 196 cannon, and
1,422 pistols. It was, however, only too clear that large numbers of
weapons were still in the hands of the population, particularly of
Patriots, who had no intention of surrendering either themselves or
their arms.
Graziani’s Claims and Admissions
The Italians were now struggling to their utmost to crush the Patriot
movement. On 26 September, Graziani hopefully claimed that his forces
had succeeded in strengthening their position in Lasta and around Debra
Berhan. He added that the operations in those regions were “so
favourable as to give me a clear feeling that in a short while the
rebellion will be everywhere broken by the inexorable impetus of our
force.”
The situation of the Italians in the north-west of Ethiopia was,
however, far less promising, and on 28 September the Viceroy was obliged
to admit that “with so vast a territory, and with two regions, Gojam
and Begemder, in ferment” it was essential to ensure possession of the
more important garrisons, for their abandonment “would signify a
deterioration in our position,” and thus encourage the rebels who were
“easily emboldened even ephemeral successes”.
“Cut Short Every Revolt” – Mussolini
Fascist impatience at the slow progress achieved was meanwhile on the
increase. Mussolini, gravely disturbed by Patriot activity, returned to
the need for a speedy conclusion of the fighting. On 1 October, he
again telegraphed to Graziani, announcing the despatch of four new
battalions, and added, emphatically, that it was “necessary to cut short
every revolt as soon as possible.”
Lessona took up the theme a week later. “I repeat,” he declared in a
telegram to the Viceroy on 8 October, “I am ready to send from here as
many troops as your Excellency considers necessary because I repeat the
rebellion must be cut short.”
Graziani, who had by now been attempting, unsuccessfully, to crush
Ethiopian, resistance for two long years, was unimpressed by such
apparently impossible demands. On the following day he bluntly replied
that “situations in general cannot be resolved except gradually and
methodically, because experience teaches us that a rebellion is easy to
cause but difficult to resolve”.
Graziani had not, however, lost his old ruthlessness. On 21 October,
he despatched a telegram to General Nasi, the fascist governor of the
Harar region, in which he declared that at Garamulata, which he termed
“the fortress of Negusism”, there “must not (I say not) remain a sole
Amhara chief whatsoever. This is my conviction which seldom errs”. A
fortnight or so later, on 3 November he was, however, obliged to report
that, despite his earlier more optimistic statement, the rebellion was
“almost total in the territories of new occupation”, by which he meant
the whole of Ethiopia, as opposed to the earlier acquired Italian
colonies, Eritrea and Somalia.
On the following day he telegraphed his recommendations for dealing
with the crisis to Lessona. Noting that there were then 111,500 Italian
soldiers in East Africa (which he considered, dear reader, a small
figure) he declared that they were insufficient, as he had “always
said”, and urged the need (1) that the capital be defended “in a secure
manner”; (2) that in the area of the railway there should be a mobile
force, as well as a fixed guard; (3) that in Shoa, which he termed “the
most hostile and warlike region”, mobile forces should be massed at
Debra Berhan and Fiche to protect the capital; and (4) that forces be
stationed also in the west for the indirect protection of the capital,
as well as to guard communication routes.
These proposals were particularly revealing, in that they show that
their author was fearful even for the security of fascist power in Addis
Ababa, and Shoa, let alone in remoter areas of the empire.
Italian Counter-Offensive
Fierce Italian attacks on the Patriots were launched towards the end
of the year 1937. On 5 November, Graziani informed his superiors in Rome
that he was about to make a demonstration into Gojam, and would issue a
proclamation calling on the people to submit and give up their arms in
return for a general pardon. On 7 November, he claimed that the
situation in Western Shoa, between Ambo and the Ghibe river, was
“improving,” and that, in Eastern Shoa, Italian forces had for the first
time penetrated between Ankober and the Kassam river. He nevertheless
admitted that there was still a significant rebel concentration at Guma,
between Jimma and Lekemti.
Such hopeful reports, written perhaps mainly to please Rome, soon
proved unfounded. The fact of the matter, as a correspondent of “The
Times”, of London, reported, from Djibouti, on November 25, was that:
“The improvement in the internal situation that was expected after
the rains is still far from apparent. The roads leading from Addis Ababa
to Jimma and Gore have both been cut recently within 50 miles of the
capital, with the result that transport has to proceed under convoy”.
“Wise Political Action… to Eliminate Amhara without Pity”
Conscious of the danger of a further expansion of the “revolt”,
Graziani was obliged to warn the Italian commanders in Jimma and Harar,
on 9 November, of the need for “wise political action towards the
natives to avoid inducing them to rebel”. He nevertheless continued to
urge them “to eliminate the Amhara without pity, according to my
directives,” “military conquest,”he declared,” imperatively excludes
sentimentalism”.
A Patriot Manifesto
The Patriot leadership, though now undoubtedly under strong pressure,
had by no means lost heart, for it knew that, sooner or later, it could
count on help from abroad. Graziani admitted as much on 9 November,
when he stated that the rebels “clearly thought in terms of a European
war, and the return of the Negus,” i.e. Emperor Haile Sellassie.
Patriot history, even then, was inextricably bound up with the
Gathering Clouds of the European War, which was to break less than two
years later.
At about this time three Patriot leaders, Zawdie Asfaw, Takale Wolde
Hawariat and Mesfin Selashi, who were then operating in Gudru and
Gindabaret, drew up a remarkable manifesto to the people of Gojam. The
Patriots hurled copies of this document by slings across the Blue Nile
into Gojam, where they came to the attention of fascist intelligence.
The document, as Graziani later reported it to Rome, was addressed to the “notables and elders of Gojam,” and declared:
“Through Christian prayer and by the will of God we stand ready to
fight and overcome for the freedom of our country and our religion,
advancing, and up to now always victorious, and not suffering any
discomfiture”.
Turning to the actions of the Italians the document declared that
they had come “to make our race disappear, and to take away our
property”, for they “did not wish the Amharas and Gallas to live and
rule”. As for Ras Hailu, the Italian’s closest collaborator, it asked
what territorial command the invaders had given him, and declared that,
while “the chiefs, notables and many of the people were being killed”,
he had “betrayed the Ethiopian people,” for he piled up wealth in the
capital, sought to register the inhabitants and cattle of Gojam for his
own advantage, and, they asserted, had even begun to choose Ethiopian
women as wives for the Italians.
“Children of Gojam and Walata Israel”, the manifesto concluded, ”
fight for the Christian religion. The more patience you have the worse
things will be for your soul, your property, your children and your
religion. Now by the will of God the rays of the sun are coming to our
country. We will very soon send you a great announcement. In the name of
our religion, you must resist the enemy at the opportune time. Above
all we advise you to fight, even with local weapons. If you do not have
enough arms send us faithful persons, and receive arms from us. We beg
you to send copies of this letter to all Gojam and Begemder. Pass on the
word to the chiefs and nobles!”
Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org
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