By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-
We saw last week how Mussolini’s entry into the European war, on 10
June 1941, led directly to Ethiopia’s Liberation, and to the country’s
occupation by British troops. Now read on:
The Italian Legacy
The collapse of fascist rule, the termination of Italian investment,
upon which the Italian East African empire had hitherto been based, the
demobilisation of colonial soldiers, many still in possession of their
weapons, the disruption of the economy, the consequent drying-up of
trade, and hence of government revenue, created major problems for newly
liberated Ethiopia, in 1941.
Neither the Emperor, whose pre-war administration had been disbanded
five years earlier, nor the British, who lacked any experience of the
country, were well equipped to run an efficient post-liberation state.
Ethiopian administration was
further handicapped by the fact that a
significant section of the educated class had died, in some cases been
massacred, during the occupation, and because education of “natives”
during that period occupation had largely ceased.
Post-Liberation Problems
Post-liberation problems were compounded by the Ethiopian
Government’s virtual inability to raise taxes, as well as by the
presence in the country of 40,000 Italian civilians. The latter were
enemy nationals, and hence a security risk, but were expected, in
accordance with then contemporary racial values, to be provided, as
Europeans, with food, and medical facilities, at the level to which they
were accustomed.
Returnees, Collaborators, and Patriots
The politics of the immediate post-liberation era were further
complicated by the widespread diffusion of Italian arms, many in the
possession of former colonial troops, and by the fragmentation of the
Ethiopian elite into three different groups: the Returnees, who had been
in exile with the Emperor, and were therefore to some extent out of
touch with the situation in Ethiopia; the Collaborators, who had worked
with the invaders, and were therefore better informed, but held in
disrepute in patriotic circles; and the Patriots, who had played a major
role in the liberation, but were in many cases unfamiliar with modern
administration. All three groups expected, and to some extent received,
posts in government service, as a reward for past services, or in
recognition of their influence, or loyalty to the monarch.
Tensions between the Centre and the Provinces
Tensions between the central government and the provinces had to some
extent been acerbated by fascist policy, which had tried to divide the
“native” population on both ethnic and religious lines. This
disintegrative tendency had, however, been largely counter-balanced by
other developments of the occupation period. These included the
improvement of roads, and the installation of a public radio address
system in the principal towns, as well as an awakened sense of Ethiopian
patriotism. The political power of the centre was likewise much
strengthened by the triumphant return of the Emperor, and by the visible
support he received from the British, who in the immediate post-war
period enjoyed a virtual monopoly of military power. Like previous
rulers he also exercised many forms of patronage, not only, as in the
past, in respect of land and political appointment, but now also in the
allocation of school places, and scholarships abroad.
A not-insignificant rebellion was, however, soon to flare in Tegray.
Ethio-British Relations
The Emperor, after his return to Ethiopia, was largely preoccupied
with relations with the British. The latter, who had entered the country
as liberators, had in fact replaced the Italians as an occupying power.
Relations between the Ethiopians and the British were from the outset
ambiguous. British policy towards Ethiopia was first enunciated, in
general terms, by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who told the British
House of Commons, on 4 February 1941, that his government “would welcome
the re-appearance of an independent Ethiopian State and recognise the
claim of Emperor Haile Sellassie to the throne”. Official British policy
was further clarified in high-level talks, held shortly afterwards in
February and March. These were based, in accordance with Eden’s
statement, on the “rejection of any idea of a protectorate”, or of “the
provision of a strong western administration of the country”.
Differing Views on Ethiopia’s Future
After the Emperor’s return to Addis Ababa, in May, there was,
however, considerable tension between the Ethiopians and the British.
The two parties differed greatly in their views on the country’s future
government. The Ethiopians expected to assume full sovereignty without
delay, whereas the British considered the country’s independence only as
a long distance objective. A first clash on this question occurred as
early as 11 May 1941, when the Emperor appointed his first post-war
cabinet. The British representative, Brigadier Maurice Lush, sternly
informed him that such appointments could not be made “until a peace
treaty has been effected with Italy” Haile Sellassie was, not
surprisingly, indignant. A compromise was, however, duly effected,
whereby the British accepted the appointment of the ministers, but
“chose to regard them as merely advisers” to the British military
administration of the country.
It was symptomatic that the Emperor’s private mail was for a time
subject to British censorship, and opened by British censors. His
Imperial Majesty, we are informed, was not amused.
“Liberators” or “Looters”?
Tension was further increased by the decision of the British military
authorities to appropriate, and take out of the country, some of the
principal factories earlier installed by the Italians, as well as
weapons, and military and other transport. Ethiopia was thus very
visibly impoverished by its liberators, who soon came to be popularly
regarded as its looters. Friction was also created by the presence, in
the Ethiopian capital, of white South African troops, who attempted to
perpetuate the strict colour bar earlier instituted by the Italians.
British opinion in relation to Ethiopia’s independence varied
greatly. Sir Philip Mitchell, the chief British Political Officer in the
Middle East, sought to impose particularly strong control over
Ethiopia, but others in London took the view that Great Britain should
demonstrate to the world that it could liberate a country without
imposing political strings. Sir Philip, because of his official
position, was nevertheless able to press the Emperor to abide by British
“advice” in “all important matters, internal and external, touching the
government of the country”; to levy taxes and allocate expenditure only
with “prior approval” of the British Government; to grant British
courts jurisdiction over foreigners; “to raise no objection” if the
British Commander-in-Chief “found it necessary to resume military
control over any part of Ethiopia”; and not to raise armed forces, or
undertake military operations, “except as agreed by His Majesty’s
Government’s representative”. Taxation, expenditure, communications, and
the jurisdiction of foreigners were to be under British control. In
return for this extensive control he proposed that the Emperor be
offered a subsidy, British advisers, and the opportunity of discussing
proposals for a treaty. British Economic Controls
Ethiopia, as a result of its liberation by the British troops, was at
this time firmly under British economic as well as political control.
The country was incorporated into the British-based Sterling Area, used
British East African Shillings, was dependent on a British bank,
Barclay’s, and was served exclusively by the British Overseas Aviation
Corporation, B.O.A.C. Virtually all political power was likewise in the
hands of the British military, who went so far as to censor the
Emperor’s private correspondence. The local British officials were so
bent on perpetuating that paramountcy that an American Government
memorandum of June 1941 bluntly asserted that Britain was seeking to
“establish a protectorate over Abyssinia”.
Proposed Partition of the Country
Some British officials at this period, and for the next few years,
moreover sought to partition the country. In the north there were plans
to unite parts of Tegray with the adjacent highlands of Eritrea, to form
a new state under British protection. In the south-east the British
Government proposed incorporating the already British-occupied Ogaden
with British-occupied Somalia, to create a Greater Somalia, under
British trusteeship. British official thinking also for a time envisaged
the partition of Eritrea, with the western portion annexed to the then
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
For all the above reasons, the fund of Ethiopian good-will towards
Britain, the Country’s Liberator, was steadily dissipated, giving way to
fear, suspicion, mistrust, and even anger.
Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org
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