By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-
We saw last week that Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian fascist
rule, by British forces, resulted in no small Ethio-British tension. Now
read on:
Haile Sellassie Unwilling to Accept British Hegemony
Haile Sellassie, 1n 1941, was unwilling to acquiesce in British
hegemony, or to accept the British political agenda. He succeeded in
despatching a telegram to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in London,
inquiring why a treaty between Ethiopia and Britain had been so long
delayed. The British Premier replied, by way of excuse, that this had
been due to a desire to ensure that nothing remained in the draft
agreement “which could be interpreted as interfering with your sovereign
rights or with the independence of Ethiopia”. The Emperor, determined
to spur the British to action, promptly had this reply broadcast on
Addis Ababa radio. The Government in London, feeling that further delays
were impermissible, thereupon summoned Sir Philip to England, where
Churchill and Eden pressed him to come to a speedy agreement with the
Emperor.
The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942
After much bargaining an Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military
Convention were duly signed, on 31 January 1942. The treaty recognised
Ethiopia as an independent state, and laid down that the Emperor was
free to form a government. Britain’s paramount position was, however,
officially recognised, and many restrictions were imposed on Ethiopian
sovereignty. The agreement thus specified that the British
representative was to be ex-officio doyen of the diplomatic corps,
followed in precedence by the British Commander-in-Chief, East Africa,
or his representative. The Emperor was obliged to appoint British
advisers, a British Commissioner of Police, and British police officers,
inspectors, judges, and magistrates. No other foreign adviser could be
appointed without consultation with the British. The latter were to be
responsible for policing Addis Ababa, and had the right to station their
military wherever they deemed necessary.
The Military Convention went further. It permitted the British to
assert military control over Addis Ababa and the country’s principal
towns, and to move their armed forces, and military aircraft, into, out
of, and around the country at will. The British military were exempt
from the jurisdiction of Ethiopian courts, and could use former Italian
state property without payment. The Emperor was obliged to requisition
and hand over to the British military authorities whatever private
property they might require. The radio station, the telephone system,
and the railway were to remain under British control. The Ethiopian army
was to be trained by a British military mission, and all
prisoners-of-war were to be handed over to the British military, who
were also to have sole jurisdiction over the repatriation of Italian
civilians. The British were, finally, allowed to remain in control of
Ogaden, the Somali-inhabited area adjacent to Italian Somalia, which
occupied almost a third of the entire country, the Reserved Area, a
smaller strip of land adjacent to British Somaliland, and the entire
stretch of territory occupied by the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway.
In return for these considerable concessions the British agreed to
provide the Emperor with an annual subsidy, amounting to a million and a
half pounds Sterling for the first year, a million for the second, half
a million for the third, and a quarter of a million for a fourth, if
the Agreement was still in force at that time.
The Emperor and Ministers Deeply Concerned
The Emperor and his Ministers were deeply concerned, not only at the
restrictions on Ethiopian sovereignty, but also at the economic
consequences thereof. The country was at that time exporting more than
it imported, and was thus contributing more to the Sterling area than it
received therefrom. The British were thus profiting from Ethiopian
exports, and appropriating resources which could otherwise have been
used on Ethiopian development. Notwithstanding this manifestly unfair
situation the Ethiopian Government was for several years reluctant to
press the British for any revision of the agreement. This was largely,
according to their American foreign affairs adviser, John Spencer,
because they were afraid that the British might retaliate by reoccupying
parts of the country. This, in the aftermath of the war, could well
have led to the government’s political de-stabilisation.
Despite such fears the Ethiopian Government eventually decided, on 25
May 1944, to demand a new agreement. Receiving no reply from the
British by 16 August it threatened to re-occupy Ogaden and the Reserved
Area. The British, towards the end of September, accordingly despatched
an envoy, Lord de la Warr, to Addis Ababa. In the ensuing talks he
stubbornly insisted on the British retention of Ogaden and the Reserved
Area. Tough negotiations followed. At one point he threatened to break
off the talks, and at another warned that the British, if balked in
their objectives, would reoccupy the entire country. A treaty was,
however, eventually signed, on 19 December 1944.
The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944
In this second Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty the Ethiopians had little
option but to agree to British demands for the continued occupation of
the Reserved Area and Ogaden. The Emperor’s negotiators nevertheless
persuaded the British to accept a reformulation of the relevant article,
Article 7, which accordingly declared:
“In order as an Ally to contribute to the effective prosecution of
the war, and without prejudice to her underlying sovereignty, the
Imperial Ethiopian Government hereby agree that, for the duration of the
Agreement, the territories designated as the Reserved Area and the
Ogaden… shall be under British Military Administration’”.
This formula, from the Ethiopian point of view, was more cleverly
devised than the British negotiators perhaps realised. The use of the
word “ally” implied that the country could no longer be treated as
“occupied enemy territory”, that it was entitled to a seat in any future
Peace Conference, and that the British occupation of the two
territories was only temporary, to no more than the duration of the war.
The reference to Ethiopia’s “underlying sovereignty” was also
significant. It enabled the Ethiopian Government immediately to
re-assert its sovereignty by granting an American concern, the Sinclair
Company, an oil concession over the area. In the rest of the treaty the
British waived their earlier insistence of diplomatic precedence,
abandoned their extra-territorial military privileges, and relinquished
their control over the Addis Ababa-Djibuti railway, and their monopoly
over aviation. The treaty thus marked the full resumption of Ethiopian
independence. It was, however, symbolic of the Emperor’s displeasure
that he did not sign the agreement, but relegated this onerous task to
his Prime Minister, Endalkachew Makonnen. Haile Sellassie also,
significantly, rejected any further subsidy from Britain.
Britain’s motive in retaining Ogaden became apparent in the Spring of
1946, when the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed that
the territory be joined to ex-Italian Somalia, and placed, together with
British Somaliland, under British Trusteeship. His government further
suggested that Ethiopia, bereft of Ogaden, should be given compensation
in Eritrea. This Greater Somalia plan, as it was called, was immediately
rejected by the Ethiopian Government, and ran into strong Soviet
opposition. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that the scheme was
designed to “expand the British Empire at the expense of Italy and
Ethiopia, and to consolidate the monopolistic position of Great Britain
in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea”.
Faced with such fierce opposition, Britain abandoned its hold on most
of Ogaden in 1948, but retained the fertile grazing land of Haud until
1954, when the entire region was at last, returned to Ethiopia. This was
a full two decades after its first alienation by fascist Italy at the
time of Wal Wal.
Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org
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