By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-
Repression in the Wake of the Massacre
Graziani’s attempted assassination resulted not only in the great 
massacre associated with his name, but also in intensified repression 
all over the country.
Mussolini, on receiving his Viceroy’s first report about the 
attempted assassination, immediately telegraphed back, on 20 February 
1937. He declared that without attributing the incident “greater 
importance” than it really had, “it showed the need for that radical 
clean sweep which, in my mind, is absolutely necessary in Shoa.”
“Get Rid of Them”
This message set the tone for the events that followed. On 25 
February one of Graziani’s commanders, Archimede Mischi, the officer in 
charge of the western stretch of the railway, reported the execution of 
42 Ethiopians, whom he described as “dangerous elements”, guilty of 
“continual activity of rebellion”. A few 
days later, on 1 March, the 
Viceroy ordered General Nasi, his governor of Harar, to shoot all the 
“Amhara notables and ex-army officers” who had surrendered. “I order”, 
he commanded:
“that they all be shot immediately according to the directions of the
 Duce repeated a thousand times… It is time to put an end to it. Your 
Excellency may keep in mind that those who made the attempt on my life –
 which although a miserable thing yet represents Italy – were all 
Abyssinian notables in the very same positions who had received pardon 
in many places. Keep in mind also that here I have already aimed at the 
total destruction of Abyssinian chiefs and notables and that similar 
measures should be completely carried out in your territories. A better 
opportunity could not be found to get rid of them. Give assurances with 
the word `shot’, but let the assurance be serious.”
Nasi, on receipt of this order, at once telegraphed to his subordinate officers, on March 2, saying:
“Shoot All – Rebels, Notables, Chiefs…”
“His Excellency the Viceroy has demanded rigorous adherence to the 
directions of the Duce for the treatment of rebels. Consequently I give 
you orders to shoot all – I say all – rebels, notables, chiefs, 
followers, either captured in action or giving themselves up after 
leaving their formations, or isolated fugitives or cunning elements 
hiding among the local populations or who even though they have not 
taken an active part in the revolt are suspected of bad faith or of 
being guilty of helping rebels in a concrete way or only intending to, 
or if they hide arms. Women are, of course, excluded, except in 
particular cases, and children. The commandants addressed will give 
necessary directions to subordinate commands and proceed meanwhile to 
execute elements captured hitherto or who are found to be in the 
categories mentioned by me above. . . Commanders addressed will give me 
immediate assurance with the word `shot’, and communicate to me as soon 
as possible the measures taken and which they will take from time to 
time in accordance with these orders.”
“A Pinch More Courage”
Similar instructions were despatched by Graziani to other commanders,
 among them Geloso, his governor at Jimma, whom he telegraphed on 8 
April, reminding the latter of “the directions of the Duce which aim at 
the complete destruction of Amharic elements in territories of former 
Abyssinian conquest: give a pinch more of courage in this respect to the
 civilian officials who are nearest you and to column commanders who, 
with the instinctive generosity of the combatant, are sometimes led to 
make terms by easily understandable sentiments. Be assured, Your 
Excellency, that by acting thus in a very short time, having now been 
furnished with all the troops and materials necessary, you will 
assuredly obtain complete pacification in your territory.”
“We Cannot Have Confidence in Priests or Nobles”
Despite this optimistic note fascist intelligence reports revealed 
extensive popular opposition. Thus Major Giuseppe Franceschino, 
reporting on 17 April on the situation at Dessie, frankly declared, “We 
cannot have confidence in either the priests or the nobles: the 
sentiment of rebellion is latent in all.”
Doubts
Fascist doubts as to the wisdom of the policy of indiscriminate 
execution were, however, sometimes voiced. Thus on 23 April, General 
Nasi in Harar sent Graziani a long telegram, in which he recalled that 
“600 chiefs and followers” had been executed after their unconditional 
surrender in Bale, but that “to encourage the dispersion” of enemy 
forces near the Webe Shebele he had later obtained Graziani’s special 
permission to spare the lives of those who surrendered. As a result of 
this it had been possible to persuade some 4,000 persons to give up the 
struggle who “would otherwise… have dispersed into the country, thus 
creating the phenomenon of brigandage which might have given us serious 
trouble and difficulties, especially during the rains”. He now urged a 
similar policy of expediency in respect of 54 Chercher chiefs, who had 
relatives among Italian “native” troops, and he argued that the “mass 
execution” of these chiefs would have “damaging repercussions on the 
efforts for pacification.” The mere fact of their having been put into a
 concentration camp, he noted, had given rise to the rumour that they 
had been executed, and this had “created panic and commotion.” He 
therefore “earnestly” begged the Viceroy to allow court procedure to 
take its place,” but added: “I assure you that it will deal with the 
utmost severity, and will end with capital punishment for the leaders 
most compromised and dangerous.”
Graziani accepted this plea, and replied: “Since in these questions 
it is shades of opinion that count, I leave your Excellency to settle 
the matter as you think best.”
The Viceroy had, however, by no means abandoned his aim of 
eliminating the Amhara chieftains, and returned to the question in the 
following month. Somewhat disingenuously he complained, on 11 May , of 
the “hypocrisy and falsehood of the Abyssinian people”, who had replied 
to his “goodness and kindness” with “treachery and bombs.” On the 
following day he despatched a telegram to all his provincial governors, 
praising what they were doing against the rebels, “be it to disarm them 
or be it to eliminate all the Amhara chiefs large or small.” The rest of
 the population, he declared, was “but an apathetic mass which once the 
chiefs are eliminated can easily be absorbed by us. Everyone must 
understand this. Civil officials and military commanders, without any 
false humanitarian pity, we must have before us but one aim which is 
that of consolidating the conquest of the Empire, above all after the 
experience acquired during a year, and to which the Amharas and 
inhabitants of Shoa have replied with bombs.”
Addis Ababa Gallows
At about this time the fascists in Addis Ababa, Sava recalls, erected
 a gallows on which “ten people could be hanged at one time.” It stood 8
 ft. above the street between the wood market and the straw market, and a
 couple of electric lights were fitted nearby to illuminate the scene as
 the bodies, closely guarded by troops, were often left hanging 
overnight, and sometimes two days and two nights. Besides each victim, 
the Hungarian adds, was “placed the rifles and other weapons taken from 
him in life, that people might understand that men were hanged for using
 weapons in the defence of their country.”
“Wizards and Soothsayers”
The Viceroy had meanwhile also directed his attention to another 
section of population, whom he chose to describe as “wizards and 
soothsayers”. These, he considered, as dangerous opponents of the 
fascist regime. On 15 March , one of his aides, Princivalle, noted that 
Addis Ababa had “already been cleaned of all spell-binding groups of 
wizards and soothsayers”, and that “a similar cleansing” was anticipated
 throughout Shoa, where such “treacherous elements” enjoyed “great power
 among the population”, “and were “particularly dangerous.”
A few days later, on March l9, the Viceroy telegraphed to Lessona, 
the Minister of the Colonies in Rome, that after the attempt on his life
 one month earlier “the political organs and police” had “shown me that 
among the most dangerous disturbers of public order one must enumerate 
the travelling minstrels, soothsayers and wizards because they 
treacherously spread among the primitive, ignorant and superstitious 
population the most untruthful news concerning catastrophic events: the 
complete destruction of the entire population by the Italians, coming 
attacks on the capital led by imposing rebel formations with foreign 
help, the forthcoming return of the Negus at the head of an imposing 
army, etc.”
Turning to the supposed influence of such persons, and his wish to eliminate them, he added :
“The population, though mistrustful of these agitators and reporting 
them to the authorities as dangerous elements, nevertheless does not 
escape from the spell of their prophecies… Convinced of the necessity of
 completely eradicating this evil plant I have given orders that all 
wandering minstrels, soothsayers and wizards in the town and the 
surroundings be arrested and shot.”
These orders had, in fact, already been largely carried out, for he 
adds: “In all today seventy have been arrested and eliminated. This 
measure has produced an excellent impression and a sentiment of 
alleviation among the native population. By a special order the exercise
 of the above professions in the future has been forbidden under pain of
 death.”
Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org
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