By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-
Ethiopia, the victor of the battle of Adwa in 1896, was by the early
twentieth century the only state in Africa to have survived the European
Scramble for the continent. The country was, however, dangerously
situated between two Italian coastal colonies, Eritrea and Somalia.
These territories could scarcely be developed in isolation from the
Ethiopian hinterland, or expanded other than at Ethiopia’s expense.
Adwa had been a turning point in the history of Ethio-Italian
relations. Italy, prior to the battle, had sought to gain control of
Ethiopia, first through Article 17 of the Wechale Treaty, and later
through military action. After the battle the Italians turned, no less
assiduously, to economic penetration. Such Italian ambitions had been
accepted, as we have seen, by Ethiopia’s two colonial neighbours,
Britain
and France, who, by the Tripartite Convention of 1906, had
recognised an Italian economic sphere of influence linking Eritrea and
Somalia, west of Addis Ababa. The French, who regarded Ethiopia as
important for the prosperity of their Somaliland protectorate, and
wished to be in good relations with Ethiopia’s ruler, later veered away
from the 1906 formula as far as Italy’s sphere of influence was
concerned. The British, on the other hand, continued as late as 1925 to
accept the principle of an Italian sphere of influence over most of
Ethiopia in exchange for Italy’s support for a proposed British dam at
Lake Tana.
The Rise of Fascism
Italy’s colonial ambitions in Africa were almost inevitably affected
by Benito Mussolini’s seizure of power in 1922, and the resultant
emergence in Rome of a militaristic, and intensely chauvinist, regime.
It was only a matter of time before the fascist state would shift
Italian policy once more from economic to military penetration, and call
on the people of Italy to “revenge Adwa”, by embarking on a new war of
conquest.
Relations between the two countries were, however, at first
superficially cordial. When Ras Tafari visited Rome in 1924 he was
warmly welcomed by Mussolini. The fascist dictator, as his wife Donna
Rachele recalls, then foresaw a “great future for Italy in Abyssinia”,
and conceived the idea of “developing Abyssinia with Italian labour”. He
found his Ethiopian visitor “a clever and cultured man”, with whom he
believed he could `get on very well’. With this in mind the Duce
sponsored the 1928 Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration in the hope of
achieving rapid Italian economic penetration through the port of Asab
and a proposed Italian-road to Dase. When, however, it became apparent
that the Ethiopian Government would not accept any infringement of its
sovereignty, the Italian fascists turned their thoughts from peaceful
pressure to outright war.
De Bono
The first steps for the new invasion were taken by Marshal Emilio De
Bono, an elderly fascist holding the post of Minister of the Colonies.
On 22 January 1930 he wrote a confidential letter to the President of
the Italian Council of Ministers, asking for a major increase in the
budget for the Italian colonies bordering Ethiopia. It would be “harmful
to embark on large expenditure”, and “ridiculous to speak of the
Romanity of the Empire”, he added, “if expansion [his emphasis] beyond
the confines of the Fatherland was not considered possible”.
The idea of a military operation was warmly accepted by Mussolini,
who argued that war could rejuvenate the Italian people, and be an
objective in itself. Accordingly, in the Spring of 1932, he despatched
De Bono to Eritrea “to see how matters stood there”. On the minister’s
return the two fascist leaders agreed that their country’s “colonial
future must be sought in East Africa”, where Italy had a “hinterland”
i.e. Ethiopia, “which could be profitably exploited” De Bono thereupon
drew up a “definite programme” in relation to the “possibilities of war”
which, he later recalled, “had to be regarded not only as possible, but
as always increasingly probable”.
De Bono’s Revelations
De Bono, in 1932-3, wrote memorandum after memorandum requesting
increased military personnel and supplies for Eritrea and Somalia, and
had several secret conversations on Ethiopia with his fascist master.
Discussing his own attitude in 1933, he recalls: “It had been my
proudest dream to end my public career as a soldier on public service.
Of course, it was not yet possible to say in 1933 – the year in which we
began to consider what practical steps must be taken in the event of
war with Ethiopia – whether there would or would not be a war in that
country; but I made up my mind to lose no time, and one day I said to
the Duce: `Listen: if there is to be a war down there – and you think me
worthy of it, and capable – you ought to grant me the honour of
conducting the campaign’. The Duce looked at me hard, and at once
replied: `Surely!’ `You don’t think me too old’, I added. `No’, he
replied, `because we mustn’t lose time’.
“From that moment”, De Bono continues, “the Duce was definitely of
the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no later than 1936,
and he told me as much. I confined myself to replying: `Very good!’ –
without expressing the faintest doubt as to the possibility that this
could be achieved [De Bono's emphasis]..
“It was the autumn of 1933. The Duce had spoken to no one of the
coming operations in East Africa; only he and I knew what was going to
happen, and no indiscretion occurred by which the news could reach the
public”.
Fascist strategy from 1933 onwards was based, De Bono explains, very
largely on political subversion in Ethiopia, designed at achieving the
country’s complete disintegration. He informed the Duce that this would
“not be a very difficult task”, provided they worked “well on political
lines”, and that disintegration `could be regarded as certain after a
military victory on our part’”. Mussolini, he adds, “thought as I did,
and ordered me `to go full speed ahead’, I must be ready as soon as
possible.
“`Money [De Bono said] will be needed, Chief; lots of money’.
“`There will be no lack of money’, the Duce replied”.
Political Subversion
Italian agents were thereafter actively engaged in the attempted
subversion of Ethiopian chiefs, and nobles, who were given lavish
bribes. Action was also taken to forment ethnic tension, particularly in
militarily strategic areas in the north and south of the country,
notably in eastern Wallo, Ogaden and Hararge. Emperor Haile Sellassie
commented at the time that he knew that many of his chiefs were
accepting Italian money, but was confident that when the testing time
came they would not betray Ethiopia. Later he declared, with unusual
bitterness, in his Autobiography, that the Italians had “always been the
bane of the Ethiopian people”.
The Changing Stance of France
The rise of Hitler and nazi Germany’s attempt to overturn the
paramount world position of Britain and France, the victors of World War
I, or “satisfied powers” as he called them, had important implications
for Ethiopia. The French, and to a lesser extent the British, came to
see “dissatisfied” nazi Germany as a potential threat to their hegemony.
They therefore became increasingly reluctant to take any stand against
Mussolini, lest it drove him into the hands of the Germans, to whom he
was, however, already linked by a common militaristic, and
“fascist”doctrine.
Such thinking led to a major re-orientation on the part of France.
Hitherto, as we have seen, she had regarded Ethiopia as a valuable
`hinterland’ for Jibuti, and had supported Ethiopian independence
against the predatory pressures of Italy, and to a lesser extent
Britain. The French Government, becoming increasingly concerned with the
situation in Europe, now, however, changed its policy. To please
Mussolini, it began to withdraw opposition to Italian expansion in
Ethiopia, and proposed that Italy in return should waive its interests
in the French colony of Tunisia.
Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org
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